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INTRODUCTION 
Municipal government is often the closest level of government to 
the people, who look to their local government for police and fire 
protection, to maintain the roads and streetlights, and to collect the 
garbage. While relatively few people have regular contact with federal 
* I would like to thank my note editors Peter Cuniffe and Mike Lechliter for their 
valuable help. Thanks also to the excellent Volume 103 Notes Office. 
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regulatory agencies, almost everyone has received a parking ticket 
from his local government. Few stop to think, however, about the role 
these political subdivisions of states play in our federal system. They 
offer a miniature version of federalism on the state level, dividing the 
power of the state and placing many important decisions in the hands 
of representatives closer to the people. Although cities, counties, and 
school districts substantially affect the lives of the average citizen, 
their relationship to state governments under the Federal Constitution 
is far from clear. States create political subdivisions, and thus have 
broad powers over them, but subdivisions do not always agree with 
their parent states' actions. Constitutional problems emerge when a 
subdivision thinks the laws of its parent state conflict with the 
Constitution or with federal law. Can the subdivision turn to the 
federal courts and federal law for protection from its parent state? 
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh1 is a leading example of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on municipalities. The Pennsylvania statute at 
issue in the case authorized the larger of two contiguous cities to 
annex the smaller. 2 Pittsburgh followed the statutory procedures to 
annex Allegheny and the annexation passed the referendum required 
by the statute. 3 Residents of Allegheny and the Allegheny city 
government filed suit to stop the annexation, lost in the Pennsylvania 
courts, and appealed to the Supreme Court. 4 The plaintiffs pursued 
theories that the annexation impaired a contract between the 
municipal corporation and its taxpayers5 and that the enlarged city 
would subject them to higher taxes, thus depriving them of property 
without due process of law. 6 The Court upheld the annexation because 
of the broad authority given to states to create and manage their 
political subdivisions, which are "created as convenient agencies for 
1. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). Other cases in this line include: Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 
250 U.S. 394 (1919) ; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304 (1898) ; Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 
100 U.S. 514 (1879); and Commissioners of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany 
County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875). 
2. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 161. 
3. Id. at 164-65, 174. 
4. Id. at 165-71. 
5. Id. at 177. The Contract Clause of the Constitution says that "No State shall . . .  pass 
any . . .  Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Justice Moody 
dismissed the Hunter plaintiffs' "novel proposition" by saying "[i]t is difficult to deal with a 
proposition of this kind except by saying it is not true." Hunter, 207 U.S. at 177. The 
plaintiffs argued this tenuous theory because the Court had previously rejected the theory 
that the charter of a municipal corporation is a contract between the municipality and the 
state. See id.; see also City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79, 91 
(1891) ("[T]he municipality, being a mere agent of the state, stands in its governmental or 
public character in no contract relation with its sovereign, at whose pleasure its charter may 
be amended, changed, or revoked, without the impairment of any constitutional 
obligation."). 
6. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 177-78. 
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exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be 
entrusted to them. "7 The state decides the nature and extent of the 
powers of a political subdivision, so it "may modify or withdraw all 
such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it 
itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial 
area, unite the whole or part of it with another municipality, repeal the 
charter or destroy the corporation. " 8  Because the state controls its 
subdivisions' borders and powers to make contracts, it can modify a 
subdivision's borders or contracts without violating the Constitution. 
City of Trenton v. New Jersey,9 the other leading case in this area, 
was a suit by a subdivision against its parent state. Trenton purchased 
the right to draw water from the Delaware River from a water 
company, which had received the right by grant from the state. 1 0  The 
state subsequently required all entities drawing water from rivers to 
pay a fee if they drew over a specified amount. 1 1  The city protested 
that the fee impaired the contract it had with the water company and 
deprived the city of property without due process of law. 1 2  The Court 
followed the reasoning in Hunter in denying the city's claim, saying, 
"[t]he power of the state, unrestrained by the contract clause or the 
Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and property of cities held 
and used for 'governmental purposes' cannot be questioned. " 1 3 
While political subdivisions clearly play a subordinate role to states 
in the federal system, they are not completely subject to the whims of 
the state legislatures. For example, a state may revoke the charter of a 
political subdivision, but it must preserve a means for the subdivision's 
creditors to satisfy their claims. 1 4  The Court has also recognized some 
7. Id. at 178. 
8. Id. at 178-79; see also City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) ("[T]he 
state may withhold, grant or withdraw powers as it sees fit."); New Orleans Water Works, 142 
U.S. at 91. 
9. 262 U.S. 182 (1923). It was heard in conjunction with City of Newark v. New Jersey, 
262 U.S. 192 (1923). The cases on state power over municipalities are often called the 
Hunter-Trenton line of cases, reflecting these two cases' leading role in the law. See, e.g. , 
Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1068 (5th Cir. 1979). 
10. Trenton, 262 U.S. at 184. 
11. Id. at 183-84. 
12 See id. at 186. The Court does not explicitly state what the city's arguments were, but 
its opinion is directed towards the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
13. Id. at 188. The Court employed a distinction between the rights and property of the 
city used for governmental purposes and those used for its proprietary purposes. The Court 
recognized that " [t]he basis for the distinction is difficult to state, and there is no established 
rule for the determination of what belongs to one or the other class." Id. at 191-92. The 
distinction "has largely been abandoned." S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of 
Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 
350 U.S. 61 (1955)). 
14. Port of Mobile v. United States ex rel. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 305 (1886). 
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limits to states' broad authority over determining the boundaries of 
their subdivisions. The Supreme Court reversed a finding of summary 
judgment in favor of the Alabama Legislature in a suit that challenged 
its new boundaries of Tuskegee, which excluded all but four African­
American citizens from the city by changing the city's shape from a 
square to a "strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure." 1 5  The 
Court held that this redrawing of the boundaries of a city stated a 
cause of action for violation of the African-American residents' voting 
rights under the Fifteenth Amendment. 1 6  In doing so, the Court 
limited the holdings of Hunter and Trenton, explaining: 
a correct reading of the seemingly unconfined dicta of Hunter and 
kindred cases is not that the State has plenary power to manipulate in 
every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its 
municipal corporations, but rather that the State's authority is 
unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution 
considered in those cases.17 
The state's power over its political subdivisions is therefore not 
completely unlimited. 
These seemingly conflicting precedents have produced confusion 
in the federal circuit courts of appeals when a political subdivision sues 
its parent state. Some circuits follow a per se rule that political 
subdivisions cannot sue their parent states under any constitutional 
provision. 1 8  Other circuits have reexamined the Hunter and Trenton 
precedents and now allow suits by political subdivisions 1 9  based on the 
Supremacy Clause. 2 0  Others have noted the confusion and avoided 
15. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960). States possess broad powers over 
the boundaries of their subdivisions, so state decisions on boundary lines are generally 
constitutional unless they involve race, see id. , or another important federal interest, like the 
Establishment Clause, see Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 
687 (1994) (holding unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause a New York law which 
carved a school district around a community of Satmar Hasidic Jews). 
16. Id. at 347-48. 
17. 364 U.S. at 344. 
18. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999); Gwin Area 
Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1984). 
19. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998); Rogers v. 
Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
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taking a stand on the issue, 2 1  and the Second Circuit has taken an 
ambiguous stance.2 2 
The Ninth Circuit has taken the lead in advancing a per se rule 
prohibiting political subdivisions from suing their parent states, most 
recently in Palomar Pomerado Health System v. Belshe.23 Palomar 
Pomerado, a health care district created by California, sued the state, 
claiming that the state regulations for reimbursements for care given 
to those insured under California's Medi-Cal program compensated 
the district less than required by federal Medicaid law.2 4 The Ninth 
Circuit ruled that, as a political subdivision, Palomar Pomerado "lacks 
standing to bring an action against the state in federal court - at least 
to the extent that its action challenges the validity of state regulations 
on due process and Supremacy Clause grounds." 2 5  The Sixth Circuit 
follows a similar per se rule.26 
21. City of Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986). 
22. The Second Circuit has decided three cases on this issue with somewhat conflicting 
results. It held that political subdivisions could not challenge a state statute under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, hinting at a per se rule. New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 
(2d Cir. 1973). The same term, the court upheld a district court's dismissal of a city's suit 
because "it had no standing to assert constitutional claims." Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 
1090, 1100 (2d Cir. 1973). The court, however, said that a political subdivision would possibly 
have standing to assert a Fifth Amendment claim. Id. at 1 100-01. A later case allowed the 
City of New York to join the governor of New York and the state corrections commissioner 
as third party defendants in a suit by prison inmates alleging overcrowding at city jails. 
Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986). The court did not analyze the issue on 
Hunter or Trenton grounds, but found the city met Article III standing requirements. Id. at 
54. These cases taken together leave the state of Second Circuit law unclear. 
23. 180 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999). The named defendant was Kimberly Belshe, Director 
of the California Department of Health Services. Id. at 1104. The court found that the action 
against Belshe was "under the category of actions against state officials that are in fact 
actions against the state." Id. at 1108. This Note similarly treats cases against state officials, 
such as the governor or a director of a state agency, as constituting suits against the state. See 
also Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996) 
vacated by reh 'g en bane, 109 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1997); City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe 
Reg'l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1980). At one time, though, the Ninth Circuit 
hinted in dicta that a complete bar on suits may not be warranted. See San Diego Unified 
Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1309 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) ("While there 
are broad dicta that a political subdivision may never sue its maker on constitutional 
grounds, we doubt that the rule is so broad." (citation omitted)). 
24. Palomar, 180 F.3d at 1106. Medi-Cal is California's health insurance program for the 
poor. Id. 
25. Id. at 1108. Although the opinion appears to leave room for suits based on other 
grounds, it specifically denies suits based on the Supremacy Clause. Id. The rule is a per se 
rule, then, for cases arising under the Supremacy Clause. Because all challenges to state laws 
on federal grounds involve the Supremacy Clause, the rule is in effect a per se rule barring 
all suits by political subdivisions. Judge Hawkins concurred but urged the Ninth Circuit to 
reexamine its position in light of the Rogers and Branson School District decisions, which are 
discussed infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text. Id. at 1109-11 (Hawkins, J., concurring). 
26. Gwin Area Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The school 
district, as a political subdivision of the State of Michigan, was in no position to attack state 
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Two circuits allow suits by political subdivisions against their 
parent states based on the Supremacy Clause. 2 7  The Fifth Circuit was 
the first to allow suits of this kind when it permitted a school district to 
challenge a Texas statute requiring school districts to participate in the 
federal school breakfast program if they had one school where ten 
percent of students were eligible for the federal program.2 8  Unlike the 
Ninth Circuit, the court held that the issue was not one of standing.2 9 
The court read the Hunter and Trenton line of cases as standing for 
"the substantive holdings that the Constitution does not interfere in a 
state's internal political organization."30 The school district was able to 
proceed with its suit because its claim was "that Congress, exercising 
its power under Article I, has interfered with Texas's internal political 
organization " and was not based on the Constitution itself.31 The court 
found that the school district met the "criteria normally governing 
standing to sue in federal court. "32 The Tenth Circuit joined the Fifth 
Circuit in allowing suits based on the Supremacy Clause, holding that 
suits by subdivisions based on the structural protection of the 
Supremacy Clause were not precluded by Trenton, which barred only 
suits based on protections of individual rights, such as those 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Contract Clause.33 
This Note argues that political subdivisions should be able to seek 
protection from their parent states under the Supremacy Clause when 
action as violative of the United States Constitution."). The Sixth Circuit, however, at one 
time found that a local school district had standing to sue the state board of education when 
it alleged that the board transferred jurisdiction over a predominantly white area to an 
adjoining district because the transfer would violate the rights of students to attend 
integrated schools and possibly subject the school board to lawsuits. Akron Bd. of Educ. v. 
State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285 (6th Cir. 1974). Gwin A rea is the Circuit's latest ruling on 
the issue, so it governs. 
27. See, e.g. , Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998); Rogers 
v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1979). 
28. Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1059, 1071. The school district argued that the state law was 
contrary to the federal school breakfast program. Id. 
29. Id. at 1069. 
30. Id. at 1070. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 1067. The school district's case, however, ultimately failed on the merits 
because the court found no conflict between the state and federal laws. Id. at 1071-73. 
33. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628-29 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Despite 
the sweeping breadth of Justice Cardozo's language, both Williams and Trenton stand only 
for the limited proposition that a municipality may not bring a constitutional challenge 
against its creating state when the constitutional provision that supplies the basis for the 
complaint was written to protect individual rights, as opposed to collective or structural 
rights."). The case involved the question of whether alterations to Colorado's trusteeships of 
public lands violated the terms of a trust established by Congress when the state entered the 
Union. Once again the court found that school district met the Article III requirements for 
standing, id. at 630-31, yet decided the case on the merits against the school district, id. at 
643. 
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alleging a conflict between state law and any federal law, be it the 
Constitution, treaty, or a federal statute. Part I argues that the 
precedential cases like Hunter and Trenton were limited to the 
constitutional provisions in question and therefore did not bar all suits 
under the Supremacy Clause. Part II shows that the issue is one of 
constitutional protection of political subdivisions, rather than Article 
III standing, which had a completely different meaning when Hunter 
and Trenton were decided. Part III finds that suits based on the 
Supremacy Clause best fit into the dual nature of our federalist system 
and rejects some possible counterarguments based on the idea of state 
sovereignty. Part IV shows that subdivisions' need to protect 
themselves supports allowing them to sue their parent states. Part V 
examines the proper rationale for Supremacy Clause suits by political 
subdivisions and rejects the reasoning of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, 
advocating instead a rationale based solely on the nature of the 
Supremacy Clause. 
I. SUITS BASED ON THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ARE PERMITIED 
BECAUSE THE CASES IN THE TRENTON LINE WERE LIMITED TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES IN QUESTION 
This Part argues that suits by political subdivisions based on the 
Supremacy Clause are constitutional because precedent in this area 
has disallowed only those suits by political subdivisions based on the 
Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. These decisions do 
not preclude suits by political subdivisions under different 
constitutional clauses. Their holdings were based on the fact that 
political subdivisions hold property and make contracts at the pleasure 
of the state, and so the state may take the subdivisions' property or 
alter their contracts without constitutional limitations. Because this 
logic does not apply to suits based on other constitutional provisions 
or federal statutes coupled with the Supremacy Clause, political 
subdivisions should have their cases resolved on the merits. 
A review of the Supreme Court's holdings in this area shows that 
they were limited to the clauses at issue in the cases, the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Contract Clause. In New Orleans Water Works, 
one of the earliest cases in this area, the Court held that the state 
could alter a contract between a city and a water company because 
"there was no contract between the city and the Water Works 
Company which was protected by the constitutional clause in 
question."34 The city, as an agent of the state, could make no contracts 
in its public character that were not subject to modification by the 
34. City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works, 142 U.S. 79, 92 (1891). 
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state.35 Regarding the city's claim of deprivation of property without 
due process, the court held that any property the city held "was not 
such a vested right as was beyond the control of the legislature. "36 The 
holding in the case was substantive: all contracts the city made and all 
property the city held were subject to the control of the state 
legislature.37 A political subdivision, therefore, cannot claim the 
protection of the Constitution under the Contract Clause for 
modification of its contracts and the Fourteenth Amendment for 
deprivation of its property.38 
Hunter raised similar issues and came to a similar substantive 
conclusion about a political subdivision's rights against its parent state. 
A political subdivision cannot look to the Contract Clause to protect 
its contracts or to the Fourteenth Amendment to protect its property 
because "[t]he number, nature and duration of the powers conferred 
upon [municipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall 
be exercised rests [sic] in the absolute discretion of the state."39 The 
state was free to force the merger of Pittsburgh and Allegheny 
because the laws giving political subdivisions their powers and 
boundaries were not "contract[ s] with the State within the meaning of 
the Federal Constitution. "40 The Court mentioned a long list of actions 
which a state could take without violating the Constitution, a list that 
the Court later found to be the "seemingly unconfined dicta of 
Hunter. "41 The list, however, is quite confined and uncontroversial. 
The state can alter the boundaries of its subdivisions, take their 
property, alter their contracts, and define the scope of the 
subdivisions' powers.42 This rule, though, does not allow a State to 
force its subdivisions to violate the Constitution or require a 
subdivision to act contrary to a federal statute. 
35. Id. at 91. As noted above, supra note 13, the distinction between a political 
subdivision's public and proprietary character has largely been abandoned. 
36. Id. at 92. 
37. Id. at 91 -92. 
38. Id. 
39. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161,  178 (1 907). 
40. Id. 
41. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1 960). The so-called "unconfined dicta" 
actually said that a state: 
at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation 
such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial 
area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy 
the corporation . . . .  In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body, 
conforming its action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any 
provision of the Constitution of the United States. 
Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79. 
42. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79. 
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If any doubt remained as to the scope of this line of cases, the 
Court has since eliminated it. In Trenton, the Court definitively 
limited these holdings to the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.4 3 The Court said that in the previous cases, no "power, 
right or property of a city or other political subdivision [was] held to 
be protected by the Contract Clause or the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 4 4  In deciding the case before it, the Court held that "the 
city cannot invoke these provisions of the Constitution" against the 
state.4 5 The Court limited its holdings in these cases to the Contract 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment 4 6 and has subsequently 
reaffirmed this limitation.4 7 It would be difficult for the Court to be 
clearer than when it said that "a correct reading of the seemingly 
unconfined dicta of Hunter and kindred cases is ... that the State's 
authority is unrestrained by the particular prohibitions of the 
Constitution considered in those cases. " 4 8  Those cases involved 
municipal property, contracts, and boundaries; they established the 
rule that a city may not seek the protection of the Contract Clause or 
the Fourteenth Amendment against the state to protect its property, 
contracts, or boundaries. The cases do not stand for a complete bar to 
all suits by political subdivisions against their parent states. 
II. EACH SUIT BY A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION AGAINST ITS PARENT 
STATE SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL MERITS, 
NOT ON STANDING 
This Part argues that Article III standing is not the dispositive 
issue when a political subdivision sues its parent state, even though 
some Supreme Court cases speak of a political subdivision's 
"standing " to sue its parent state. In following these cases, the Sixth 
and Ninth Circuits apply a per se rule denying "standing" to political 
subdivisions in suits against their parent states.4 9 This Part begins by 
43. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923) ("The power of the State, 
unrestrained by the contract clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and 
property of cities held and used for 'governmental purposes' cannot be questioned."). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 192 (emphasis added). The provisions in question were the Contract Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 188. 
46. Id. at 192; Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79; City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water 
Works, 142 U.S. 79, 92 (1891). 
47. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (1960). 
48. Id. at 344. 
49. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(dismissing a health-care district's suit against its parent state of California because the 
district, as a political subdivision, "lacks standing to bring an action against the state in 
federal court - at least to the extent that its action challenges the validity of state 
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showing that the Court has found that political subdivisions can meet 
the modern requirements for standing. It then argues that the 
confusion stems from the fact that "standing" had a different meaning 
when the older cases in the Hunter line were decided and that standing 
was not the threshold issue it is today. It concludes by examining the 
precedential cases to show that they were decided on the merits, not 
on the jurisdictional question of standing. 
Precedent shows that political subdivisions can meet the Article III 
standing requirements. The Supreme Court ruled in Board of 
Education v. Allen that school board officials have standing to 
challenge state laws they allege to violate the Constitution.50 In Allen, 
school board officials brought suit against the state education 
commissioner, claiming that a state law which required public school 
districts to loan textbooks to private school students was 
unconstitutional.51 The Court found standing for the board members 
because they faced a choice between violating their oath to support 
the Constitution should they follow the statute and losing their jobs 
should they refuse to do so. 52 The injury asserted by a political 
subdivision facing a choice of whether to follow an allegedly 
unconstitutional law or to face the consequences of disobedience thus 
fits in the Article III standing requirements. It is an imminent harm, 
causally related to the state's action, which can be remedied by an 
injunction prohibiting enforcement of the state law or a judgment that 
the state law is constitutional.53 The federal circuit courts which deny 
"standing " do not address Allen and give only conclusory reasoning to 
state that political subdivisions lack standing.54 
regulations on due process and Supremacy Clause grounds."); Gwin Area Cmty. Sch. v. 
Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1984) ("We agree with the district court's treatment of 
the standing question. The school district, as a political subdivision of the State of Michigan, 
was in no position to attack the state action as violative of the United States Constitution."). 
50. Bd. ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
51. Id. at 240. 
52. Id. at 241 n.5. Justice White, the author of Allen, later dissented from the denial of 
certiorari of a Ninth Circuit case on the grounds that the court's per se rule against suits by 
political subdivisions against their parent states was inconsistent with Allen. City of S. Lake 
Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 449 U.S. 1039 (White, J., dissenting). 
53. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
54. See Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1246 
(9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). As Judge Reinhardt explained: 
Id. 
South Lake Tahoe did not explain whether concerns about the standing of political 
subdivisions or concerns about the constitutional rights they possess underlay its holding. 
The court discussed the issue in a section of the opinion that concerned its jurisdiction and 
was entitled 'The City's Standing'. However, it made no reference to the usual standing 
criteria, and its reasoning, although elliptic, appears to be addressed to whether the city 
possessed a cause of action. (citation omitted). 
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The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, though, based their rule on a few 
Supreme Court cases that declared that political subdivisions lacked 
"standing" to bring Constitutional claims against their parent states.ss 
The Court, in deciding a case which did not involve political 
subdivisions, said in dicta, "municipal corporations have no standing 
to invoke the contract clause or the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution in opposition to the will of their 
creator."s6 The Court has also said that political subdivisions were 
"without standing to invoke the protection of the Federal 
Constitution. "57 This language was based on different conception of 
standing and has misled some of today's courts into denying standing 
to political subdivisions. 
Reliance on the word "standing " by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits is 
a case of judicial equivocation. Standing today has a distinct meaning58 
and is a necessary element of federal-court jurisdiction that must be 
satisfied before the court reaches the merits of a case.59 Standing did 
not have this definite meaning in the early twentieth century when 
Hunter, Trenton and their progeny were decided.60 In the early part of 
55. See City of S. Lake Tahoe v. Cal. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 233 
(9th Cir. 1980) (citing Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933)); see also 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939); Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 
F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999); Gwin Area Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 844 (6th 
Cir. 1984). 
56. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 441. A municipal corporation, i.e., a city, is a species of 
political subdivision. Coleman involved the validity of the Kansas legislature's approval of a 
constitutional amendment, involving questions of the lieutenant governor's tie-breaking vote 
in the State Senate, whether time had lapsed for approval of the amendment, and whether 
the legislature could subsequently approve the amendment after previously rejecting it. Id. 
at 433-38. As the Court's discussion of political subdivisions was unnecessary for its holding, 
the language is dicta. It should be noted that the Court, even in dicta, limits the impact to the 
Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. 
57. Williams, 289 U.S. at 47. 
58. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. The Court summarized standing law as follows: 
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact -
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - the injury has to be 
fairly . .. traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the 
independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
59. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (explaining that Article III "requires a 
litigant to have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court"). 
60. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 224-25 (1988). As 
Fletcher explained: 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a plaintiffs right to bring �uit was 
determined by reference to a particular common law, statutory, or constitutional right, or 
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this century, "[a] party had standing - or a 'right,to sue' - if it was 
correct in its claim on the merits that the statutory or constitutional 
provision in question protected its interests; standing was not seen as a 
preliminary or threshold question."6 1 The Court's old conception of 
standing is exemplified by City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water 
Works Co.62 In the case, the Court held that a political subdivision, 
"being a municipal corporation and the creature of the state 
legislature, does not stand in a position to claim the benefit of the 
constitutional provision in question. "6 3 The city thus had no standing, 
as understood in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century to mean that the constitutional clause in question protected its 
interests, to claim the benefit of the Contract Clause when its parent 
state altered a contract the city had with a water company. This 
holding does not mean that the city has no standing whatsoever, in the 
modem sense, to bring constitutional claims against its parent state. 
The precedential cases in this area were actually decided on the 
merits.6 4 Hunter held that the relationship between the citizens of a 
city and the city itself is not a contract65  and that "inhabitants and 
property owners . . . have no right, by contract or otherwise, in the 
unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and 
there is nothing in the Federal Constitution which protects them from 
these injurious consequences."66 Trenton held that the state's power 
over its political subdivisions was "unrestrained by the contract clause 
or the Fourteenth Amendment. "6 7 The Court, therefore, held that "the 
city cannot invoke these provisions of the federal Constitution 
against . .. the state law in question."68 These cases were not dismissed 
sometimes to a mixture of statutory or constitutional prohibitions and common law remedial 
principles . . . .  But no general doctrine of standing existed. Nor, indeed, was the term 
'standing' used as the doctrinal heading under which a person's right to sue was determined. 
(footnotes omitted). 
Id. "The creation of a separately articulated and self-conscious law of standing" began in the 
last half of the twentieth century due to the emergence of the administrative state. Id. at 225. 
A watershed case in the development of the standing doctrine was A ssociation of Data 
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Lujan court 
developed its three-part test from a survey of the Court's cases "over the years. " 504 U.S. at 
560. 
61. Rogers v. Blockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1070 (5th Cir. 1979). 
62. 142 U.S. 79 (1891). 
63. Id. at 89 (emphasis added). The clause in question was the Contract Clause. 
64. See Alexander Willscher, Comment, The Justiciability of Municipal Preemption 
Challenges to State Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 250 (2000). 
65. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 176-77 (1907). 
66. Id.atl79. 
67. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923). 
68. Id. at 192. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Trenton's companion case, 
Newark. City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923). The Court held that "[t]he 
enforcement by the state of the provision of the act .. . does not violate the equal protection 
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for lack of jurisdiction, as they would be if they did not satisfy modem 
standing requirements,69 but instead established a substantive rule that 
the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause do not protect 
political subdivisions against actions by their parent states. They do 
not establish a rule of standing whereby a political subdivision is 
presumptively unqualified to bring federal legal actions against its 
parent state. 
Early twentieth century holdings regarding "standing" cannot be 
applied today because of the drastically different meaning the term 
had then. Continuing to analyze the status of political subdivisions 
under the heading of "standing" breeds confusion and is not faithful to 
precedent. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, "[t]he opinions in the 
Hunter and Trenton line of cases do occasionally - but by no means 
uniformly - speak of 'standing.'" 7 0  The opinions do not reflect 
anything resembling the modem test for standing, looking for actual 
injury, causation, and whether the injury could be redressed by the 
court.71 Analyzing past suits by political subdivisions using modem 
standing doctrine is a misunderstanding of the Trenton line and of the 
historical development of the standing doctrine. 
Furthermore, "the sweeping breadth of Justice Cardozo's 
language" 7 2  in Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore13 should not be allowed 
to tum a rule developed for particular constitutional clauses into a 
complete bar to suits by political subdivisions against their parent 
states. In Williams, the Court said that a political subdivision "has no 
privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may 
invoke in opposition to the will of its creator." 7 4  Arguing that this case 
means that political subdivisions can never invoke the Constitution 
against its parent state involves a drastic overreacting of precedent. 
This one sentence is the only support for such a universal rule, and the 
first two cases cited for the proposition are Trenton and its companion 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .  The city cannot invoke the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment against the State." Id. at 196. 
69. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 ("we finally arrive at the 
threshold jurisdictional question: whether respondent, the plaintiff below, had standing to 
sue"). 
70. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1070 (5th Cir. 1979). See, for example, Trenton, 
262 U.S. 182 (1923); Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161 (1�7); and City of New 
Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works, 142 U.S. 79 (1891) for cases that do not use the word 
"standing." 
71. See, e.g. , Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also Indian 
Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
72. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628 (10th Cir. 1998). 
73. 289 U.S. 36 (1933). 
74. Id. at 40. 
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case, City of Newark v. New Jersey.15 As this Note has discussed 
earlier, Trenton, Newark, and their predecessors were limited to the 
constitutional clauses in question. If that were not enough, the 
Supreme Court itself has said these cases stand for the proposition 
that "the State's authority is unrestrained by the particular 
prohibitions of the Constitution considered in these cases." 7 6 
Courts today should follow the model established in New Orleans 
Water Works and Trenton, deciding the case on the merits based on 
the constitutional clauses in question. 7 7  These cases implicitly involved 
the Supremacy Clause, because every attempt to invalidate a state law 
on federal constitutional grounds includes a Supremacy Clause claim 
to establish the primacy of federal law over state law. 7 8  The Supreme 
Court in New Orleans Water Works and Trenton gave the political 
subdivisions a fair hearing on their constitutional claims but ultimately 
decided that the Constitution afforded them no protection under the 
facts of their cases.7 9 Political subdivisions today deserve no less. Of 
course, a political subdivision must realize that to win on the merits, it 
must overcome the broad powers that a state holds over its 
subdivisions. States, though, should not be able to hide behind those 
powers to shield themselves from all suits. The courts need to ensure 
that states stay within their constitutional bounds in their treatment of 
political subdivisions. 
75. Id. (citing City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); City of Trenton v. 
New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923)). 
76. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960). 
77. See Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Reg') Transp. Auth., 653 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(dismissing a suit by a political subdivision against its parent state under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it was barred by precedent, including Newark and Williams). 
78. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819). As Chief Justice Marshall 
explained: 
Id. 
In discussing these questions, the conflicting powers of the general and state governments 
must be brought into view, and the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in 
opposition, must be settled. 
If any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it 
would be this - that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme 
within its sphere of action. This would seem to result, necessarily, from its nature. It is the 
government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though 
any one state may be willing to control its operations, no state is willing to allow others to 
control them. The nation, on those subjects on which it can act, must necessarily bind its 
component parts. But this question is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express 
terms, decided it, by saying, "this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall 
be made in pursuance thereof," "shall be the supreme law of the land." 
79. See, e.g., Trenton, 262 U.S. at 192 ("We hold that the City cannot invoke these 
provisions of the federal Constitution."). 
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Ill. FEDERALISM SUPPORTS ALLOWING SUITS 
Allowing suits by political subdivisions also fits with the nature of 
our constitutional system. These suits merely allow federal courts to 
ensure that states respect their constitutional limitations. Although 
"the cases . . . reflect the general reluctance of federal courts to 
meddle in disputes between state governmental units,"8 0 and the 
federal courts should be very cautious about interfering in the internal 
political organization of a state, federal courts have every right to 
interfere with the internal political organization of a state if it violates 
the Constitution.8 1 The Court has even said that "the power of the 
legislature over all local municipal corporations is unlimited save by 
the restrictions of the state and Federal constitutions."82 Hunter and the 
cases in its line held that certain activities of states, such as modifying 
a contract of one of its subdivisions or annexing a smaller city to a 
larger city, do not violate the Constitution. 8 3  The power of a state over 
its political subdivisions should guide a court when it decides the cases 
on the merits, as it did in Hunter and Trenton, but should not act as a 
complete bar to suits by political subdivisions. 
Suits by political subdivisions that allege a violation of federal law 
are in keeping with the structure of our federal system. These suits are 
a restraint on states that act contrary to federal law, the supreme law 
of the land. The federal government serves as a check on the state 
governments just as state governments act as a check on federal 
power.8 4 To this effect, the Court has quoted approvingly from the 
Federalist Papers: 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government 
will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state 
government, and these will have the same disposition towards the 
general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either 
scale will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by 
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.85 
80. Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 755 (3d Cir. 1991). 
81. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 345. 
82. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898) (emphasis added). 
83. Trenton, 262 U.S. at 192; Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907); 
City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works, 142 U.S. 79, 92 (1891). Of course, even 
these actions may be unconstitutional. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346. The Court said that a state 
is not insulated from judicial review in these matters of state interest if "state power is used 
as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right." Id. at 347. 
84. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("[A] healthy balance of power 
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse 
on either front."). 
85. Id. at 459 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 180-81 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
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Some try to defend a per se rule on the grounds that suits by 
subdivisions undercut the states' ability to serve as checks on federal 
power. 86 This argument, though, misunderstands the dual nature of 
our federal system. Federal protection is needed to ensure that states 
operate within their constitutional bounds just as much as states are 
needed to ensure that the federal government respects its limits. If the 
states operate within their bounds, they will have no problem 
defeating suits by their political subdivisions. 
Nor do suits by political subdivisions contravene notions of state 
sovereignty because the proper scope of state sovereignty can only be 
determined after an investigation of substantive federal law, which 
provides the bounds of state sovereignty. A Supremacy Clause 
challenge to a state law by its nature alleges that the state is acting 
outside of its sovereign powers. Some argue that suits by political 
subdivisions impede state sovereignty and unacceptably weaken states 
in our federal system because a state's decision on its internal political 
organization is an important element of state sovereignty that should 
be left to the states without federal interference. 8 7  This argument fails 
to note, though, that the bounds of state sovereignty can only be 
determined by first addressing the merits of the subdivision's claim. If 
a state is acting within its constitutional bounds, the political 
subdivision's suit will be dismissed on the merits, as in Hunter and 
Trenton.88 States still can rely on precedents like Hunter and Trenton 
to justify their decisions on the boundaries and powers they give to 
their subdivisions. The broad powers of states over their subdivisions, 
as defined in Hunter,89 also ensure that mere political disagreements 
between states and their subdivisions will not end up in federal courts. 
Suits based purely on political disagreement would be precluded 
because a political subdivision must allege a conflict between state law 
and a specific federal law to state a claim.90 The only problem for 
states with suits by political subdivisions would be when they are 
86. See Willscher, supra note 64, at 254 ("[S]tates sued by their municipalities will suffer 
a blow to their dignity."). 
87. Willscher, supra note 64, at 254-55. 
88. It is interesting to note that the two most recent federal circuit court cases which 
recognized political subdivisions' ability to sue their parent states ultimately rejected the 
subdivisions' claims on the merits. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 643 
(10th Cir. 1998); Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1073 (5th Cir. 1979). 
89. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
90. Branson School D istrict, 161 F.3d at 630 ("[M]ere disagreement by a political 
subdivision with the policies of its parent state will not be sufficient to overcome the 
traditional barrier to political subdivision standing."). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the 
requirement that the state allegedly violate a controlling federal law eliminated the concern 
about political subdivisions turning to federal courts whenever they disagreed with their 
parent states. Id. 
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acting unconstitutionally and hence cannot defend their actions based 
on state sovereignty. 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 9 1 shows how debates 
about state sovereignty are actually debates about whether a 
constitutional violation exists in the first instance. Voters in the state 
of Washington approved a ballot referendum requiring children to 
attend the school nearest to their residences, and the Seattle, Tacoma, 
and Pasco school districts brought suit to defend their now-illegal 
busing programs used to achieve racial integration. 9 2  The Court, by a 
five-to-four margin, held that the referendum was unconstitutional 
because it subjected integration programs to "a debilitating and often 
insurmountable disadvantage, " thus denying equal protection of the 
law to minorities. 9 3  Justice Powell, for the four dissenting justices, 
argued that the Constitution permitted a state to adopt a 
neighborhood schools program because "the State - exercising its 
sovereign authority over all subordinate agencies - should be free to 
reject" mandatory busing in the absence of segregation. 9 4  What seems 
to be a debate between those willing to interfere with state sovereignty 
and those who are not is really a veiled debate about the protections 
afforded by the Equal Protection Clause. The majority believed that 
Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause with its law; the fact 
that the law was passed through the popular political process was 
therefore irrelevant. 9 5  The majority reached its conclusion because 
"the State is obligated to operate [its educational] system within the 
confines of the Fourteenth Amendment. That, we believe, it has failed 
to do. " 96 The dissent, while using state sovereignty arguments, found 
91. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
92. Id. at 459-64. The busing programs were initiated by the school districts, not in 
response to a lawsuit or court order. Id. 460-61 .  The proposed law said that "no school 
board . . .  shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the 
school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence." Id. 
at 462 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 28.A.26.010 (1981)). The Court did not address the 
specific issue of whether the school districts, as political subdivisions, could sue their parent 
states. The Court indirectly answered the question by framing the issue as "not whether 
Washington has the authority to intervene in the affairs of local school boards; it is, rather, 
whether the State has exercised that authority in a manner consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause." Id. at 476. 
93. Id. at 484. The Court did not analyze any standing issues, but seemed to assume that 
a school district could raise the constitutional rights of individual minority students. 
Community groups intervened in support of the districts, and these groups presumably had 
standing to represent the interests of parents and students. See id. at 464. 
94. Id. at 500 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
95. Id. at 476 ("But 'insisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it 
desires . . .  furnish[ es] no justification for a legislative structure which otherwise would 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the implementation of this change through 
popular referendum immunize it."' (quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)). 
96. Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 487. 
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that there was no Equal Protection violation.9 7  Courts should consider 
the broad powers of states over their subdivisions and notions of state 
sovereignty when deciding whether a constitutional violation exists, 
but not use them as a preemptive bar to all suits by political 
subdivisions. 
While state legislatures are the proper forums for working out 
political questions in states, legislatures cannot avoid judicial review 
merely by the fact that they represent the people.98 In the context of 
political subdivisions, the Court has said that a "statute which is 
alleged to have worked unconstitutional deprivations of petitioners' 
rights is not immune to attack simply because the mechanism 
employed by the legislature is a redefinition of municipal 
boundaries."99 Defenders of a per se rule advance the arguments that 
municipalities' interests the state political system protects and that any 
conflict between states and their political subdivisions amounts to a 
political question not appropriate for resolution in court.100 This 
argument, however, suffers from the same weaknesses as the 
argument based on state sovereignty because "insisting that a State 
may distribute legislative powers as it desires . . . furnish[ es] no 
justification for a legislative structure which otherwise would violate" 
the Constitution.1 0 1  
Furthermore, there are mechanisms other than a per se ban on 
suits by political subdivisions to ensure that purely political questions 
stay out of the courts. Established doctrines, like the standing doctrine 
and the political question doctrine, make certain that these purely 
political disagreements stay out of the courts. 1 0 2 A court also can rule 
97. Id. at 494 n.8 (Powell, J. ,  dissenting) ("The Court has held that 'the Equal Protection 
Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies that were not 
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place."' (quoting Crawford v. L.A. Bd. of 
Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 538 (1982)). Justice Powell also found the ballot initiative to be race­
neutral and did not present significant enough burdens "such that interference with the 
State's distribution of authority is justified." Id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., dissenting). The State 
was free to legislate as it chose because there was no constitutional violation, but Justice 
Powell did recognize that judicial intrusion could be justified if there were a violation. See id. 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
98. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). 
99. Id. The Court further elaborated that " (w]hen a State exercises power wholly within 
the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is 
not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally 
protected right." Id. 
100. Willscher, supra note 64, at 258 ("The state lawmaking process is the exclusive 
forum for working out controversies between a state and its municipalities."). 
101. Seattle School District, 458 U.S. at 476. 
102. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). As the Court explained: 
Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual "cases" and 
'controversies' . . . .  [T]he "case or controversy" requirement defines with respect to the 
Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is 
founded. The several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that requirement are 
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as a matter of law that a certain state action is properly resolved 
through the political process; the Supreme Court did so in Hunter 
regarding municipal annexations, holding that "[t]he power [to 
authorize annexations] is in the State, and those who legislate for the 
State are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of 
it." 1 0 3  The subdivision's claim must be heard, though, because it alleges 
that the state had no power to make the challenged law in the first 
place either because it was unconstitutional or precluded by federal 
law. The court must examine the state action in question before it can 
decide whether it is best left to the political process. An a priori rule 
that all state actions concerning its political subdivisions are political 
matters not subject to judicial review contradicts Allen's resolution of 
an Establishment Clause challenge to a state law by a school board 104 
and Gomillion's warnings that state actions in areas traditionally left 
exclusively to the state are reviewable if used as a pretext to 
circumvent constitutional rights.1 05 The real debate is about the proper 
role of federal law as applied to a state's internal political 
organization. These questions should be resolved explicitly in each 
case on the merits, not through a per se rule preventing suits by 
political subdivisions regardless of the constitutional clause or federal 
law alleged to be violated. Thus, concerns that suits by political 
subdivisions would give political subdivisions that lost in the political 
process a "second bite at the apple" are misplaced. 
While courts should allow suits by political subdivisions against 
their parent states, they should continue, as they always have, to give 
proper weight to issues of state sovereignty and the broad powers 
states enjoy over their subdivisions. Some suits are foreclosed by 
precedent, such as suits challenging state alterations of municipal 
contracts under the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause 106 
and suits challenging the state's decisions as to the boundaries and 
powers it gives to subdivisions under the same clauses. 1 0 7  Some federal 
Id. 
founded in concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a 
democratic society. (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
103. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). Some actions that affect 
political subdivisions clearly are not wholly within the domain of the state. It would be 
ridiculous to argue that the exclusive forum for school boards to challenge loans of 
textbooks to students at religious schools is the state legislature. See Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 
392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment clearly bears on the 
question and so the issue is appropriate for judicial review. See id. at 242-44. 
104. See A llen, 392 U.S. at 241 n.5. 
105. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960). 
106. See, e.g. , City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923). 
107. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79. To successfully challenge these actions, a subdivision 
would have to allege some sort of racial bias in the way the state drew the boundaries or 
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circuit courts of appeals have relied on Trenton to foreclose suits by 
political subdivisions under the Equal Protection Clause, 1 0 8 though this 
is in tension with Seattle School District, a Supreme Court case that 
dealt with an Equal Protection claim brought by a school district 
against its parent state. 1 0 9  Political subdivisions face an uphill battle to 
succeed in their suits, meaning lawsuits will rarely be an effective 
solution.U 0 Mere political disagreements between subdivisions and 
their states do not belong in federal court, which should only be used 
to resolve legitimate questions of the constitutionality of a state 
action. 1 1 1  
States may also be concerned that allowing political subdivisions to 
sue under federal statutes via the Supremacy Clause will lead to undue 
Congressional interference in state affairs. 1 1 2 To address this concern, 
the Supreme Court provides states with protection from congressional 
overreaching through its "working assumption that federal legislation 
threatening to trench on the States' arrangements for conducting their 
own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in 
a way that preserves a State's chosen disposition of its own power." 1 1 3  
The Court used this assumption to find that states could prevent their 
subdivisions from providing telecommunications service, even though 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 says that "[n]o State . . .  may 
prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to 
allocated powers to subdivisions. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347. Other avenues could 
possibly succeed if the subdivision alleged that the state action was somehow a way of 
"circumventing a federally protected right." Id. 
108. Trenton, 262 U.S. at 188 ("The power of the state, unrestrained by 
the . . .  Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights and property of cities held and used for 
'governmental purposes' cannot be questioned."). See, e.g., S. Macomb Disposal Auth. v. 
Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986); City of Moore v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 699 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1983). 
109. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982). A political 
subdivision would probably have to allege some sort of racial discrimination in the way its 
parent state allocated powers to subdivisions, for example if a predominantly black city was 
given inferior powers to a predominantly white city without an adequate justification. In any 
event, the subdivision would be a proxy, asserting the right of its inhabitants to Equal 
Protection. 
110. See supra note 88. 
111. See supra note 59. 
112. At one time the Court found this reasoning persuasive and prevented Congress 
from extending the Fair Labor Standards Act to state employees and the employees of 
political subdivisions. Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Court found 
that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power to "displace the States' freedom 
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852. 
The Court soon retreated from this stance, though. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The Court found the "traditional government function" test is 
not only "unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism." Id. 
at 531. 
113. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 124 S. Ct. 1555, 1565 (2004). 
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provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."11 4 
Thus, courts will not infer that a statute was meant to interfere in the 
relationship of a state and its subdivisions absent clear congressional 
intent.1 1 5  States also can argue that a statute is unconstitutional 
because it exceeds Congress's power under Article 1.1 1 6  Suits by 
political subdivisions based on the Supremacy Clause merely require 
that states act within their constitutional bounds by obeying applicable 
Constitutional provisions and validly passed federal laws. The 
possibility of Congressional interference, however, results from 
federal supremacy and the courts' expansive reading of Congress's 
Article I powers,11 7 and is a problem for states whether or not political 
subdivisions can sue their parent states. 
IV. A SUBDIVISION'S NEED TO PROTECT ITSELF SUPPORTS 
ALLOWING SUITS 
Political subdivisions are created by states "as convenient agencies 
for exercising such of the powers of the state as may be intrusted to 
them."11 8 It is only reasonable to allow these agents the ability to 
protest when they believe the state is asking them to do something 
they could not do themselves, i.e., violate federal law. Political 
subdivisions would be subject to lawsuits by individuals harmed by 
these alleged violations of federal law,119 so political subdivisions 
should have the ability to prospectively protect themselves from such 
114. Id. at 1559 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000)). The Court interpreted the statute to 
exclude political subdivisions because the text and legislative history did not show 
congressional intent for their inclusion as "entit[ies]" under the Act. Id. at 1565. 
115. Id. at 1565; Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256 
(1985). Lawrence County involved a South Dakota statute that required subdivisions to 
distribute federal payments in lieu of taxes (payments from the federal government to 
substitute for taxes not collected by the subdivision on tax-exempt federal property) in the 
same manner as they distribute local taxes. Id. at 258. The Court held the state statute 
unconstitutional because "the language and legislative history of the federal statute indicate 
that Congress intended local governments to have more discretion in spending federal aid 
than the State would allow them." Id. 
116. See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1070-71 (5th Cir. 1979). The state's 
arguments, if advanced today, would be limited by Garcia, but the state would still have 
strong arguments under Hunter if Congress attempted to draw municipal boundaries or 
interfere in a similar area of state interest. 
117. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 560 ("[T]oday's decision effectively reduces the Tenth 
Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause.") (Powell, J., dissenting). 
118. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). 
119. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Malcom, 803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986). The case involved a suit 
by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought against New York City's Department of 
Corrections, and the city moved to join the State of New York as a third-party defendant. 
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lawsuits by challenging the state action before they are forced to obey 
an arguably unconstitutional law.1 2 0  
Benjamin v. Malcolm,121 a Second Circuit case that addressed 
solely modem standing requirements without considering the Hunter 
and Trenton line of cases, powerfully shows the need to allow political 
subdivisions to sue their parent states. In Benjamin, prisoners at a New 
York City jail sued city prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1 983, 
alleging overcrowding in violation of their constitutional rights under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 2 2  The district court granted 
the city's motion to join the Governor and state prison commissioner 
when the city alleged that state policies, including housing state 
prisoners in city jails, contributed to the overcrowding.1 2 3  The state 
appealed the joinder, arguing in part that the city had no standing to 
press a joinder claim, an argument which the court found "needs little 
discussion."1 2 4  Several potential injuries gave the city standing: 
contempt sanctions from the court for noncompliance, the cost of 
millions of dollars for more detention facilities, and the threat of 
another riot if the state did not promptly remove its prisoners from the 
city jails.1 2 5  
A per se rule barring suits by subdivisions against their parent 
states would allow the state to pass state violations of federal law, like 
overcrowded prisons, and the resulting legal liabilities onto political 
subdivisions without giving the subdivisions judicial recourse to make 
the state pay its fair share. Suits by political subdivisions allow 
subdivisions to protect themselves against their parent states and serve 
to hold states accountable when states shift the blame for their 
unconstitutional behavior onto subdivisions. As shown by Benjamin, 
the state should not be able to pawn its constitutional wrongs off onto 
its subdivisions and then claim that political subdivisions have no right 
120. See Akron Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285, 1290 (6th Cir. 1974) 
(recognizing "the right of a school board to resist in the federal courts pressures upon it to 
prevent its performance of its duties in accord with the Constitution of the United States") 
(citing Brewer v. Hoxie School District No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956)). The 
constitutional duty in the case was the duty to provide racially integrated schools. Id. 
121. 803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986). 
122. Id. at 47. 
123. Id. at 49. The city was detaining state offenders until they could be moved to state 
facilities. Id. The district court ordered the state to take the prisoners within forty-eight 
hours, "finding that the State's failure promptly to take these prisoners off the City's hands 
strained the latter's facilities beyond constitutionally tolerable limits so that the State was in 
effect simply seeking to spread the burden of impermissible overcrowding rather than 
eliminating it." Id. 
124. Id. at 54. 
125. Id. The Court did not mention the fact that the City could be subject to § 1983 
money damages allegedly due in part to state conduct, which seems to be another potential 
injury to the city. 
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under federal law to challenge state actions. In fact, the state could 
avoid political accountability for some of its constitutional wrongs by 
shifting the blame to subdivisions and transferring the fiscal 
responsibility for the violations to local taxpayers. Political 
subdivisions should have judicial recourse to avoid this kind of blame 
shifting by the state. 
Furthermore, a per se rule could keep the party in the best position 
to claim an injury out of court. In fact, the standing doctrine 
sometimes makes political subdivisions the only parties in a position to 
challenge a state action, as exemplified by Rogers. In Rogers, a school 
district challenged a state law that required it to provide breakfast at 
school, claiming that the law forced it to expend money to administer 
an allegedly unconstitutional law.1 26 A taxpayer likely would not have 
standing to challenge the state law based solely on the expenditure of 
funds.1 2 7  A student's claim that an expenditure of money on breakfasts 
would entail less money for other programs might not suffice to confer 
standing on the student, as a court could find that the interest in funds 
is not particular to that student. 1 2 8  The school board is the party in the 
best position to bring suit, and the only one that definitely meets the 
Article III standing requirements.1 2 9  It is most familiar with federal 
and state education law, is in the best position to know of a potential 
conflict, and faces the most direct injury from the state law, the same 
injury the Court recognized in Allen. The per se rule could possibly 
126. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1979). 
127. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
U.S. 464, 478 (1982) ("This Court has held that the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of 
the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis 
for an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over their manner of expenditure."); see 
also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923) (holding that an individual 
taxpayer suffered an injury only in an "indefinite way in common with people generally" 
when challenging the expenditure of funds, and so there was no justiciable case). 
128. See supra note 127. The student would have to show an "injury in fact," for 
example, that somehow the expenditure of money on the school breakfasts consequently 
reduced spending in another area which hurt him. This may be difficult to prove and could 
be rejected as analogous to the problems associated with taxpayer standing. See Mellon, 262 
U.S. at 487-88 (dismissing taxpayer's suit claiming that an expenditure of funds was 
unconstitutional because the spending did not cause the taxpayer an injury distinct from 
people generally). While municipal taxpayers have standing to challenge their municipality's 
actions which result in the expenditure of municipal funds, see, e.g. , United States v. City of 
New York, 972 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1992), they do not necessarily have standing to 
challenge state actions that cause their municipality to spend money, see Bd. of Educ. v. New 
York State Teachers Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d 106, 111  (2d. Cir. 1995). But see Gwin Area 
Cmty. Sch. v. Michigan, 741 F.2d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding standing for municipal 
taxpayers to challenge state action). Thus, the school district may be the only party with 
Article III standing to sue. 
129. The school board would have standing under Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 
241 n.5 (1968), and under the court's reasoning in Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1059-60,as was noted 
in supra Part I. 
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leave no one with standing to bring suit, effectively barring judicial 
review of the allegedly unconstitutional state action. 
Another possible important use for suits by political subdivisions is 
to protect themselves when acting more as private entities than 
governments, such as employers, health care providers and other 
functions not unique to governments.1 30 The need for such protection 
is increasing as states create more subdivisions that blend public and 
private functions, like the Business Improvement District, which 
"[c]ombin[es] public and private, as well as city government and 
neighborhood elements" to improve the quality of life and business 
environment of the district.1 31 Allowing suits by subdivisions acting as 
businesses while preventing others would run close to the now­
abandoned distinction between subdivisions acting in their public 
capacity and acting in their private, proprietary capacity.1 32 As noted 
above, 1 33 the Court has recognized the ability of Congress to regulate 
the employment of state and municipal employees. 1 34 If a state tried to 
prevent its subdivisions from complying with the federal workplace 
guidelines, the subdivisions would have a good argument to enjoin the 
enforcement of such an action. While the individual workers would 
also have standing to challenge the state action, there is no good 
reason why a political subdivision acting as an employer should be 
forced to sit out and risk hurting relations with its employees, merely 
because it is an agent of the state. 
Palomar Pomerado provides a good example of an area in which 
suits by political subdivisions may be needed to ensure state 
compliance with federal law. Palomar Pomerado was a state-created 
health care district formed under California law that provided nursing 
130. See City of Cleveland v. Indus. Comm'n, 455 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1983) (distinguishing Trenton because "the actions in this case are proprietary in nature as 
they relate to the employer-employee relationship like any other Ohio employer"). The case 
was a dispute over whether the state Industrial Commission could collect premiums from the 
City of Cleveland, which had been underbilled as a result of a mistake by the Commission. 
Id. at 1086-87. The court found that the Commission's practice of not billing employers for 
underbilled premiums, if the error was not discovered for more than two years after the 
original bill was submitted, should apply to the city as well as to private corporations and 
individuals. Id. at 1089-90. 
131. Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts 
and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366-67 (1999) (reporting that there are over 
one thousand Business Improvement Districts in the United States, with many being created 
in the 1990s). The health care districts in Palomar Pomerado similarly provided a service, 
health care, that often is provided by private entities. See Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. 
Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999). 
132 See, e.g. , City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191 (1923). The distinction 
has been described as a "quagmire" and "has largely been abandoned." S. Macomb Disposal 
Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 1986). But see City of 
Cleveland, 455 N.E.2d at 1089. 
133. See supra note 112. 
134. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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services.U 5 Palomar Pomerado alleged that the state's formula for 
reimbursement under the state health insurance plan was below the 
federally mandated rates under Medicaid.1 36 If Palomar Pomerado's 
allegations were true, California could subvert federal health care 
policy merely by forming health care subdivisions, and the Ninth 
Circuit's per se rule would preclude review.1 37 Conceivably, a state 
could undermine federal schemes for health care, or any other issue, 
by forming political subdivisions. Of course, California's plan may 
have been perfectly consistent with federal law, but its legality was 
never tested because the Ninth Circuit's per se rule precluded a 
judgment on the merits. Courts should tread carefully when judging a 
state's actions, but a per se rule would deny a court the opportunity of 
reviewing even the most egregious state violations of federal laws 
merely because the complaining party is a political subdivision. 
V. THE NATURE OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ALONE IS THE 
PROPER RATIONALE FOR ALLOWING POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS TO 
SUE THEIR PARENT ST ATES 
The Constitution makes federal law supreme, whether it be a 
statute, a treaty or the Constitution itself. Therefore the Supremacy 
Clause alone requires that political subdivisions be allowed to prove 
that a state is violating any controlling federal law. More complex 
rationales for allowing such suits, like those employed by the Tenth 
Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, impose additional limitations which are 
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause. Part V.A analyzes and rejects 
the reasoning the Tenth Circuit used to allow subdivision suits to 
proceed on the merits. Part V.B finds the Fifth Circuit's rationale to 
be an overreading of the precedent. Part V.C shows that the 
Supremacy Clause gives political subdivisions the ability to argue that 
a state law violates either the Constitution or a controlling federal law. 
A. The Tenth Circuit's Rationale Misreads the Precedent 
The Tenth Circuit used a distinction between individual rights and 
structural rights when it allowed a suit by a school district against its 
parent state.1 38 The court read the Trenton line of cases as standing 
135. Palomar Pomerado Health Sys. v. Belshe, 180 F.3d 1104, 1 106 (9th Cir. 1999). 
136. Id. The Ninth Circuit never reached the merits of the claim because it followed the 
Circuit's per se rule against suits by political subdivisions against their parent states. Id. at 
1108. 
137. Id. at 1108. 
138. Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 628-30 (10th Cir. 1998). The case 
involved a Colorado referendum that changed the managing principles of its public lands 
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"only for the limited proposition that a municipality may not bring a 
constitutional challenge against its creating state when the 
constitutional provision that supplies the basis for the complaint was 
written to protect individual rights, as opposed to collective or 
structural rights." 1 39 The court found the Supremacy Clause to be a 
structural protection and thus not barred by the Trenton line. 14 0 The 
court held that the subdivision must be "substantially independent" 
from its parent state to proceed with its suit and found school districts 
in Colorado to be independent from the state government.14 1 
While the Tenth Circuit was creative in its reading of precedent, its 
creativity does more to confuse the issue than to clarify it. The initial 
problem is the distinction between individual and structural rights, 
which does not come from Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Tenth 
Circuit imported concepts into the precedents that the Court did not 
consider. The Supreme Court in Hunter, Trenton, and like cases did 
not draw distinctions between constitutional provisions that protected 
individuals and those that were structural protections. Further, the 
Court in those cases hinted that municipalities could seek the 
protections of the Constitution for property or contracts held in its 
proprietary capacity, showing that the Court was not completely 
opposed to giving municipalities the protection of "individual rights" 
in certain circumstances.14 2 The Court's holdings in the precedential 
cases were based on the powers states have over their subdivisions, 
not on whether the right involved was individual or structural. For 
example, the Court in Trenton found that the Contract Clause did not 
protect the city's contract with the water company because the state 
controlled the city's powers to make contracts and the state could 
therefore modify the city's contract, not because the Contract Clause 
is an individual right which does not protect political subdivisions. 14 3 
trust. Id. at 626. The land trust was established by Congress when Colorado entered the 
Union; thus the school district argued that the Supremacy Clause did not allow the state to 
override the terms provided by Congress. Id. 
139. Id. at 628. 
140. Id. at 629. 
141. Id. The court followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Lassen v. Arizona ex 
rel. Arizona Highway Department, 385 U.S. 458, 459 n.1 (1967). School districts were 
independent because state law allowed them to hold property in their own name, to enter 
into contracts, and to sue and be sued in their own name, and because they were led by 
independently elected school boards. Branson School District, 161 F.3d at 630. Most political 
subdivisions would meet this test. 
142. City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191 (1923); Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) ("It will be observed that in describing the absolute 
power of the State over the property of municipal corporations we have not extended it 
beyond the property held and used for governmental purposes."). The distinction has largely 
disappeared, see supra note 13, but its existence shows that the Court at the time was not 
analyzing the problem based on the categories of individual and structural rights. 
143. Trenton, 262 U.S. at 188. 
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The Tenth Circuit also did not provide any guidance in 
determining the difference between an individual right and a 
structural right or cite cases that illustrate the distinction; it merely 
stated that the Contract Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment 
protect individual rights and that the Supremacy Clause is a structural 
right. 1 4 4  The court did not address the fact that the Supremacy Clause 
is not a right but only a gateway to challenge a state law on federal 
grounds. 
In addition, the distinction does not accurately reflect the Supreme 
Court's decisions in this area. The Court in Allen allowed a suit by a 
school board challenging a state law on the grounds that it violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 1 45 The protections of 
the First Amendment, along with the whole Bill of Rights, seem to be 
best classified as individual rights. One could argue, however, that the 
Establishment Clause is a structural right because it prevents the 
establishment of a state religion and keeps religion out of the structure 
of government. The difficulty in deciding the question, though, further 
points out the confusing nature of the Tenth Circuit's distinction 
between individual rights and structural rights. The distinction also 
does not account for the Supreme Court's decision in Seattle School 
District, which overturned a state neighborhood-schools law that was 
challenged by school districts on Equal Protection grounds. 1 46 The 
Tenth Circuit lists the Fourteenth Amendment as an individual right, 
yet the Supreme Court granted relief to a school district against its 
parent state on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. To be fair, the 
Supreme Court itself, in Seattle School District, did not explicitly 
address the issue examined in this Note. It is not helpful, however, to 
add a poorly defined distinction on top of an already confusing area of 
law. 
B. The Fifth Circuit Comes Closer to the Mark, but Still Falls Short 
The Fifth Circuit read the Trenton line of cases to stand for the 
proposition that "the Constitution does not interfere in the internal 
political organization of states." 1 4 7 The court read the cases in 
harmony with a principle dating back to Chief Justice Marshall: 
[T]he framers of the constitution did not intend to restrain the states in 
the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for internal government, 
and . . .  the instrument they have given us, is not to be so construed . . . .  
144. Branson School District, 161 F.3d at 628-29. 
145. Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
146. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
147. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1069 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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. . .  If the act . . .  be a grant of political power, if it create a civil institution 
to be employed in the administration of government . . .  the subject is 
one in which the legislature of the state may act according to its own 
judgment, unrestrained by any limitation of its power imposed by the 
constitution of the United States.148 
The Fifth Circuit then reasoned that while the Constitution does not 
interfere in states' internal political organization, "[t]here is every 
reason to think that Congress may interfere with a state's internal 
political organization in ways that the Constitution itself does not."1 4 9  
Therefore, the court allowed the school district to argue its claim that 
Texas's school breakfast statute contravened the federal school 
breakfast statute.1 5 0  
The Fifth Circuit's reading of precedent is more accurate than the 
Tenth Circuit's reading, but it still lacks the necessary precision. The 
court, while noting that the Supreme Court has recognized 
constitutional limits on a state's power over its subdivisions, 1 51 
interpreted the precedential cases as standing for an absolute rule that 
gives the Constitution no role in the political organization of states. 1 5 2  
This absolute rule contradicts Supreme Court cases, even those cited 
by the court; most notably, Gomillion acknowledged that the Fifteenth 
Amendment limits a state's ability to draw the borders of its 
subdivisions, particularly when done for racial reasons.1 5 3  In a slightly 
different context, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause 
limits a state's ability to apportion the seats in its state legislature1 5 4  
and draw voting districts for its political subdivisions.1 5 5  The Court, 
while consistently recognizing the broad powers of states over their 
subdivisions, has noted that the "the power of the legislature over all 
local municipal corporations is unlimited save by the restrictions of the 
148. Id. (quoting Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629-30 
(1819)). 
149. Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1070. The case was decided while National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was still good law, so Congress was bound by the holding that 
"there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not be 
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative 
authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the 
authority in that manner." Id. at 845. 
150. Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1071. 
151. Id. at 1069. 
152 Id. 
153. Id. (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)). 
154. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). While 
legislative districts are not political subdivisions as understood for the purposes of this Note, 
legislative districts would seem to fit the Fifth Circuit's broad language of "internal political 
organization." Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1069. At the very least, the Fifth Circuit needs to refine its 
definition of "internal political organization" to exclude voting districts. 
155. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
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state and Federal constitutions. "1 5 6 The Fifth Circuit would have been 
better to avoid such a categorical denial of the constitutional limits on 
state power over its internal political organization. While the Court 
ha.s not recognized many limits, some cases do run afoul of the 
constitutional limits, and the Fifth Circuit's categorical phrasing would 
preclude review of these cases merely because the complaining party 
is a subdivision. 1 5 7 
C. The Supremacy Clause Itself Provides the Rationale for Suits 
Although both circuits used faulty rationales in reaching the 
conclusion to recognize suits by political subdivisions, they both 
contain the seeds of the proper reasoning. The Tenth Circuit 
recognized that federal law "trumps any contradictory state law 
through the operation of the Supremacy Clause."1 5 8  The Constitution 
makes federal law supreme, so political subdivisions should be given 
the opportunity to prove that a state is transgressing a controlling 
federal law, whether it be a statute, treaty, or the Constitution itself. It 
is antithetical to the supremacy of federal law to forbid a court from 
deciding a case on the merits if it is brought by a party who meets the 
standing requirements and involves a claim that a state is acting 
contrary to federal law. The nature of the Supremacy Clause demands 
that a political subdivision receive the opportunity to prove its case in 
court; it may win or lose, but at least the case should be heard. A rule 
of this kind "simply allows a political subdivision to sue its parent state 
when the suit alleges a violation by the state of some controlling 
federal law."1 5 9  
The Fifth Circuit and Tenth Circuit allow suits based on 
controlling federal law, but do not extend this to constitutional 
challenges.1 60 The Supremacy Clause logic that would allow suits based 
156. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898). 
157. The Eleventh Amendment acts as an independent limitation on suits against states, 
and such independent limitations should be honored. There is no such explicit limitation on 
suits by political subdivisions, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar most suits by 
political subdivisions because they seek injunctions to prevent continuing violations of 
federal law and not money damages. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (citing Ex 
parte Young, 209 US 123, 155-56, 159 (1908)). As the Court said in Green, "the availability of 
prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. 
Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate 
the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law." Green, 474 U.S. at 68. This 
reasoning works for all suits of this kind, whether brought by political subdivisions or not. 
158. Branson School Dist. v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 630 (10th Cir. 1998). 
159. Id. 
160. Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1069 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[T)he Constitution does 
not interfere with a state's internal organization of its political functions."). See Branson 
School District, 161 F.3d at 628 ("[W)e conclude that a political subdivision has standing to 
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on federal law works equally well with suits based on the Constitution. 
The Supremacy Clause makes both the Constitution and laws passed 
by Congress supreme, so a distinction between federal statutes on one 
hand and the Constitution on the other makes no sense. Courts should 
not adopt a flat rule that the Constitution never intrudes on a state's 
regulation of its subdivision, as the Fifth Circuit appeared to do, 
because the precedent in this area involved the application of specific 
constitutional provisions to specific state actions. 1 6 1  Rules developed in 
cases of annexations and charter alterations should not be extended 
blindly to the cases of today, which involve issues like prison 
conditions and the interaction of federal and state education law. 
While the Constitution has often afforded no protection to the 
municipalities in past cases, it may provide protection in the future 
under different circumstances.1 6 2  Courts should see cases like Hunter 
as guides, not as dispositive of the issues. Each case should be decided 
on whether the state law in question violates the Constitution or an 
applicable federal law. As noted by the Tenth Circuit, "[t]he 
Supremacy Clause guarantees no less. "1 6 3  
CONCLUSION 
Political subdivisions should be allowed to sue their parent states 
when they allege a conflict between state law and federal law, whether 
the Constitution, a treaty, or a statute. The circuits that dismiss these 
cases based on "standing" misinterpret the precedent from a time 
when "standing" had a different meaning than the jurisdictional 
meaning it has today. The Supreme Court precedent in this area does 
not foreclose these suits, and in fact a decision on the merits in each 
case would be in keeping with the precedents, which themselves were 
decisions on the merits. In addition, these suits help ensure that states 
comply with federal law and give political subdivisions an option when 
their parent states ask them to follow an arguably unconstitutional 
bring a constitutional claim against its creating state when the substance of the claim relies 
on the Supremacy Clause and a putatively controlling federal law."). The Tenth Circuit does 
not explicitly bar claims based on the Supremacy Clause coupled with a constitutional 
provision, but its use of "federal law" seems aimed at federal statutes. See id. 
161. See supra Part I. 
162. See Ala. NAACP State Conference v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Ala. 1967). 
Alabama passed a statute that prohibited local school districts from complying with the 
school desegregation requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 349. The 
federal district court held that the action by the Alabama legislature violated the Supremacy 
Clause. Id. A political subdivision would have a strong argument against a similar attempt by 
a state legislature to supersede federal law, showing that federal law might sometimes 
intrude upon a state's "internal political organization." 
163. Branson School District, 161 F.3d at 630. 
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law. Political subdivisions should receive the same protection from the 
Supremacy Clause that every other entity enjoys. 
